Stephen
Kershnar
Pro-lifers and Killing Abortion-Doctors
Dunkirk-Fredonia Observer
August
31, 2015
Over the summer, the Center for
Medical Progress released secretly recorded videos of Planned Parenthood
officials that appear to capture a criminal conspiracy by the organization to
sell fetal body parts. Several states responding by cutting Planned
Parenthood’s funding. Congress tried to defund it, but the attempt died in the
Senate. While embarrassing, and perhaps criminal, the videos are less
intellectually troubling than the pro-lifers implicit commitment to violence.
There
is a history of violence by pro-life forces against abortion providers. The New York
Times reports that between 1978 and 1993,
there were over one hundred bombings and arsons of clinics, more than three
hundred invasions, and over four hundred incidents of vandalism.
Pro-life
violence has also resulted in eight people being killed, including four
doctors, two clinic employees, a security guard, and a clinic escort. Two
examples are worth considering. On October 23, 1998, Dr. Barnett Slepian was
shot to death with a high-powered rifle at his home
in Amherst, New York. On May 31, 2009, Scott
Roeder shot and killed Dr. George Tiller as the latter served as an usher at a
Wichita, Kansas church. The leading pro-life groups publicly reject this
violence.
The problem is that if the pro-life
position is true, then the above killings and some of the other violence are
justified. The argument is straightforward. Lethal violence may sometimes to be
used to defend innocent parties and, if the pro-life position is true, then, sometimes,
assassinating abortion-doctors is an instance of such defense.
By
analogy, consider the following case. A Nazi worker drives his truck to his job
at the death camp, Treblinka. His job is to drop Zyklon B into the shower-like
rooms that are used to kill Jews. A Jewish resistance group kills the worker
with an anti-tank round when he is a mile away from the camp. They do so in
order to save Jewish lives. Under German law, assassinating death camp workers
is illegal and punishable by death.
It
intuitively seems the resistance group can permissible assassinate the worker.
On the pro-life position, the Nazi worker is analogous to an abortion-doctor,
the Jews who would otherwise be killed by the worker are analogous to fetuses,
and the Jewish resistance is analogous to the pro-life resistance.
To
deny this analogy, the pro-life opponent of assassinating abortion-doctors has
to deny that the Nazi worker may be assassinated or show that, on pro-life
assumptions, assassinating him is different from assassinating an
abortion-doctor. The pro-life position blocks both moves.
The pro-life
argument for assassinating abortion-doctors makes the following assumption:
Abortion is as wrong as killing adult people and is wrong for the same reason. On
different accounts, abortion is wrong because it kills an innocent, infringes
the fetus’ rights, violates the Golden Rule, conflicts with God’s prohibition
on such killing, deprives the fetus of a valuable future, or brutalizes the
killer. The reason one of these wrong-making features is present depends on
further assumptions concerning whether the fetus is a person or human being, is
loved by God, has a valuable future, and so on.
The
pro-life commitment to violence can be seen in that on almost every pro-life
view, killing a fetus is as wrong as killing a newborn. If defending a
newborn’s life warrants lethal force, then so does killing a fetus. This can be
seen in the above case in that the resistance may kill the Nazi worker if his
job consisted of gassing Jewish newborns.
One
objector might claim that assassinating doctors is illegal. This objection is
weak because morality and legality are distinct. Slave-owning was immoral even
though it was legal. Helping slaves escape was moral even though it was
illegal.
A
second objector might argue that it is always wrong to kill someone,
intentionally kill someone, commit violence, intentionally commit violence, and
so on. If this is a commitment of the pro-life position, then it is rather
implausible. This would rule out defensive war and lethal protection of
children being slaughtered. For example, the Catholic Church is pro-life but
holds that some wars are permissible.
A
third objector might claim that pro-life assassination is justified only if benefit
of the killing exceeds its cost. From the pro-life perspective this is likely
the case because assassinating and harassing abortion clinics reduces their
frequency and each additional life saved is likely to add a happy person to the
world. It is also reasonable to think that having children will even add to the
lives of mothers who are prevented from getting an abortion. This rests on psychological
studies of the effects of motherhood, including unwanted motherhood.
If
we have to trade off a fetus for an abortion-doctor, then, in terms of costs
and benefits, the tradeoff is worthwhile. The happiness the fetus gains by not
being killed likely outweighs that lost by the doctor and his grieving family
members. This is because, on average, the fetus has more years of life ahead of
her than does the doctor.
This
fetus’ being more important is further evidenced by the fact that, in many
cases, the abortion-doctor completed some or all of his reproduction and the
fetus has not yet reproduced. Also, because, on average, aborted fetuses have
demographic features (for example, black and poor) that suggest that they will
have more children than abortion-doctors and will reproduce at a younger age
(thus shortening reproductive cycles), there is even more reason to believe
that in terms of producing happy people, a fetus’ life is more valuable than that
of an abortion-doctor.
In
short, consistency requires that if those who accept the pro-life position also
accept assassinating abortion-doctors. If you think such assassination is
crazy, you’re no pro-lifer, despite your protestations on Sunday. The reason
almost no one believes that it’s okay to kill abortion-doctors is that they
really don’t think that a fetus has a right to be in the woman’s body when she
doesn’t want it there.
LOCATION a: DFOKershnar190.mat; Art. Sum. Set #60: Disc
#1; Box #13-99; 08/31/15
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