02 December 2009

Rape and Evolution V: Another response to faculty and staff

Colleagues:

Thank you for your notes. I said the previous note was my last. I lied.

I thought I’d defend this sentence.

“Whether the most effective way to stop men from acting out on these desires is to strengthen criminal penalties, educational programs that focus on making men aware of these desires and the need to control them, discouraging women from dressing in provocative ways, or other means is in part an empirical question and not one that can be answered by common sense.”

First, what this sentence says and was meant to say is that the best way to discover which ways of combating rape are most effective, or effective at all, is by empirical investigation not by common sense. From this sentence, it does not follow that changing people’s attire affects the frequency of rape. I take no position on this issue. Because I think empirical investigation is the best way to discover the best teaching methods, traffic rules, baseball strategies, and lots of other things, I didn’t think the sentence was controversial. After I wrote it, I thought that one of my philosophy department colleagues might respond by busting my chops for making such a minimal claim.

This just repeats the very helpful comments of my colleague, Leonard Jacuzzo.

Second, even if something were an effective means to prevent rape from happening, it does not follow that it is morally required or permitted. For example, it might be that one way to reduce murder and rape is to increase the frequency of abortion. It does not follow from this claim, and this claim alone, that abortion is morally required or permitted. Here I take no position on the moral or legal status of abortion or whether abortion reduces violent crime.

Third, even if an act were an effective means to prevent a result, it does not follow that a person who omits to do it is blameworthy for the result. Here it is helpful to distinguish who is to blame for a result and what is a prudentially wise thing to do. An act might be prudentially unwise without making the agent responsible for the result. To see the distinction, imagine that a professor, Jones, runs in the middle of the night in downtown Detroit. His colleagues tell him that this is not safe. He responds that if bad guys beat him up, then they are to blame for his injuries. His colleagues would likely agree with him and still tell him that it is not a wise decision to go running in the middle of the night in Detroit. I take no position on whether changing one’s attire is prudentially wise.

In summary, the sentence does not entail that (1) attire affects the frequency of rape, (2) modest attire is morally required or permitted, or (3) victims are in any way to blame for an attack.

Thanks and I hope your semester is finishing well,
Steve K

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