01 March 2007

Moral Responsibility

The Objectivist
MORAL RESPONSIBILTY: IT JUST AIN’T SO
Dunkirk-Fredonia Observer
Sunday, February 25, 2007

A central issue in philosophy and politics is whether human beings are morally responsible for what they do. Persons really are morally responsible only if they really are worthy of praise or blame for what they do. The idea that human beings are morally responsible also lies at the heart of our emotional reaction to bad behavior. For example, our feelings of anger and resentment toward rapists presuppose that they are blameworthy.

To see why human beings are not morally responsible, imagine a computer that is conscious, that is, it has thoughts and emotions. Now all computers have three aspects: input, processing, and output. The input consists of the commands that the user types into it. The processing consists of the way in which the silicon chip converts the electric patterns that are the typed-in commands into electrical firing patterns that are the output. The output is often displayed via words or images on the computer screen. Even if the computer were conscious, it still wouldn’t be morally responsible for its output. This is true even if the computer had the power to re-shape its silicon-chip “brain” since the re-shaping decisions would be merely the result of the previous structure of the silicon chip and the typed-in commands. This wouldn’t stop us from getting angry at the computer, but it would make such anger misplaced.

Now consider an individual human being. By analogy, the input in this case is the environmental forces, the processor is the brain, and the output is the person’s behavior. Like a computer, an individual can change his brain states (and accompanying thoughts) only as a result of previous output, where this output is merely the result of previous brain states and external input. An individual can no more step outside of himself to shape his brain than he can jump out of his own skin. This discussion might be a little hard to follow, but the basic idea is that a person can’t stand outside of himself and decide what sort of person to become because the decision depends on who he already is.

One common objection to this argument is that human beings have free will. That is, given all of an individual’s mental states (for example, what he wants and believes), he still doesn’t have to do one thing rather than another. For example, even if we knew all of a person’s thoughts, he still wouldn’t have to do one action (for example, give chocolate to sick children) rather than another (for example, rob a liquor store). The problem is that if there are factors besides an individual’s preceding mental states that generate his actions, these factors are random or arbitrary. Random or arbitrary factors do not explain why human beings are morally responsible for their actions.

A second objection is that we are immediately aware of our own free will. In deciding what to do, we consider the pros and cons of various options and choose the best one. That is, we know that we are morally responsible because we can observe how we freely make decisions. Since a person knows that he is morally responsible for what he does, there must be something wrong with my argument. The problem with this objection is that our self-awareness doesn’t establish moral responsibility any more than a computer’s self-awareness would make it morally responsible. All we really observe is the translation of our thoughts into action and this doesn’t require free will.

A third objection is that we are morally responsible not because we have free will, but because we don’t have it. The idea is that we are responsible for what we do because our thoughts and actions reflect who we are. This objection is the opposite of the first two because it rests on the denial of free will. This view of responsibility is often held by persons who view the human mind as the brain since it allows them to hold that persons are responsible even though their actions are solely the result of what happens in their brain. The problem here is that if our thoughts and actions are dictated by what affects the brain and if we can’t control what affects the brain (for example, our environment and genes), we aren’t morally responsible for our thoughts and actions. This is analogous to the way in which I’m not responsible for who wins an Oscar because I have no control over it.

The implications of human beings not being morally responsible for their thoughts and actions are striking. First, if correct, this proves that God doesn’t exist. The underlying idea here is that a perfect being like God would tolerate the ocean of evil that has characterized human history only if it is explained by something really good and the only plausible explanation is that evil results from human beings being morally responsible. Since human beings aren’t morally responsible, the widespread existence of evil conflicts with the notion that the world had an all-knowing, all-loving, and all-powerful creator.

Second, without moral responsibility, it’s unclear why human interests (specifically their pleasure and pain) should count more than that of other animals. That is, if human beings are merely another animal, albeit with a wider range of thought and behavior, it’s unclear why their well-being is more important than that of other animals (for example, pigs and chickens). This threatens to undermine the case for our current mistreatment of these animals in factory farming.

The idea that human beings are morally responsible for what they do lies at the heart of many of our beliefs and emotions. Sadly, we just don’t have it.


The Theist
THE BLAME GAME: A-OK
Dunkirk-Fredonia Observer
Tuesday, 02/27/07

I’m certain that at least one morally responsible being walks the earth, because I know that my own actions are often blameworthy or praiseworthy. Let’s focus on the negative. When I lie, cheat, or treat someone cruelly, I not only believe, but know that I’ve done something blameworthy. But The Objectivist urges us to believe that no human is ever praiseworthy or blameworthy for anything. If he’s right, the entire realm of moral thought is based on a delusion. Do you think a wife-beater deserves punishment, while the man who jumped in front of the oncoming subway to save the seizure victim should be lauded? According to The Objectivist, you’re as mistaken as the astrologer who thinks people’s personality traits and fates are determined by imaginary influences from far-off planets.

Strong claims require strong evidence. If I tell you I had eggs for breakfast, you’ll reasonably just take my word for it. But if I tell you that I saw Bigfoot and the Loch Ness Monster going for a joy-ride in a UFO driven by Elvis, then you’ll demand somewhat stronger evidence than my mere word. So one would expect The Objectivist to offer us rock-solid evidence for his earth-shattering discovery that no action is ever praiseworthy or blameworthy.

Instead, we get only a flimsy analogy. Here it is: intentional action is to a human being like output is to a computer. The idea is that in both cases, the result (action, or “output”--say, on a screen or on a printer) is wholly determined by the “input”(total environment) together with the automatic “processing” (brain processes, computer chip process). Neither the human nor the computer has any real control over what it does--so my friend The Objectivist would have you believe.

You may be impressed by this analogy because some of our actions--be they thoughts, words, or bodily movements--do seem like that. Thus, if the phone rings, I automatically answer it, and if I suddenly stumble upon a fat man in a Speedo, I automatically let out a shriek and cover my eyes. But other actions do not seem that way--they don’t just automatically issue forth from us. Think about the last time you had to make a really difficult decision, such as whether to take one job or another. You have substantial reasons to accept, and to reject both jobs, but you may only choose one, and the jobs seem about evenly matched. When facing a choice like this, you feel free, that is, able to choose one, or to choose the other. Or suppose that you’re married, but you’re tempted to have an affair with your hottie co-worker. Here, your conscience says “No” but your body says “Yes.” (Your spouse, and his or her lawyer, say “No.”) Who will you listen to? It seems that it’s up to you. You’re like a king with multiple advisers giving him clashing advice. You’re free to take the advice of one or the other. Just because you’re subject to influences, doesn’t mean you have no control over the outcome.

Therefore, here’s a better analogy. A normal human is like a man paddling a canoe in a river. The currents are at various times and places on the river weaker or stronger. Sometimes, they push his little boat where they will. At other times, even though his boat is pushed, he puts the tip of his paddle in the water and steers. Sometimes he’ll move away from one current to another one. And sometimes, he even goes upstream, directly against the current. Sometimes he’s strong, and sometimes he’s weak. Sometimes his canoe has momentum, and sometimes it’s dead in the water. Sometimes he’s asleep at the paddle, and the river takes full control. Though he’s far from omnipotent, he is the pilot, and he does, sometimes and to some degree, control where that canoe goes.

This analogy seems to better fit our experience. We don’t stand aloof from the world; we’re almost always buffeted by influences from within and without. Still, we do sometimes freely decide, and freely act. Sometimes the current is strong, and our control is correspondingly week. But at other times, the river flows so slowly that it’s like paddling on a calm, windless lake.

One aspect our human agency that my analogy doesn’t do justice to, is that over the course of a lifetime, as we make a thousand small decisions, we can shape, as it were, the river’s currents. Think of the most disciplined, mature, and spiritual person you can imagine. Now contrast him or her with the poorest excuse for a human you can imagine--someone who is addicted to pork rinds and porn, thinks “Guess what--chicken butt!” is really witty, and devotes most of his waking hours to watching professional wrestling and kicking his dog. Even if their external circumstances were comparable, we believe that the “river” (the thoughts, emotions, and desires) of the mature person would be “calmer” than that of the undisciplined knucklehead. The latter would be frequently driven by his animal desires and emotions, while the former would be freer to say “Yes” or “No” to them. And we can further suppose that these two people are identical twins, and were raised in the same family, but over the course of their lifetimes, they freely made very different sets of choices.

In conclusion, a question to ponder: if you adopt the view that there’s no such thing as moral responsibility, which of these two people are you probably going to become more like?

5 comments:

The Objectivist said...

I liked the theist's argument.

However, I would argue that I provide an argument as well as an analogy. The argument is that person cannot choose his network of mental states (at least the most important elements) any more than a computer can by itself change the most important parts of its operating instructions.

As such, we are not morally responsible.

Note that this argument is independent of the determinism/indeterminism debate.

The Objectivist said...

AH, STEPHEN, WHAT FALSE HOPE YOU GAVE IN RECENT ARTICLES ABOUT RECYCLING AND THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF FOOD. ONE COULD DISCERN AN ACTUAL PROGRESSION OF LOGICAL ARGUMENT LEADING TO A CONCLUSION. DID I FINALLY DETECT THE INTRUSION OF CLARITY? OH WELL, ALL THINGS MUST
PASS.

IN THE REALM OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, THAT OF THE WRITER IS TO ENRICH, RATHER THAN TO WASTE, THE TIME OF THE READER. ONCE AGAIN YOU HAVE MANAGED TO EVADE INTELLIGIBILITY WHILE ERECTING A MEANDERING, GLOOMY CHINA WALL OF INDIRECTION BURDENED WITH THE YOUR TRADEMARK IRRELEVANCE (LET'S DRAG IN GOD, CHICKENS, PIGS AND THE OSCAR - YOU CAN ACTUALLY MAKE YOUR POINT WITHOUT THEM) AND THE USUAL POOR ANALOGY.

THE PARAGRAPH ON THE IMAGINARY COMPUTER WAS A HOOT! CONSIDER SENSORS, RECURSION AND SELF-MODIFYING CODE BEFORE EXPLORING THAT TERRITORY.

I BEGAN ANNOTATING EACH PARAGRAPH AND GAVE UP IN DESPAIR. IS IT ASKING TOO MUCH THAT, AT THE VERY LEAST AND PREFERABLY NEAR THE BEGINNING, THE PROPOSITION TO BE TESTED - MORAL RESPONSIBILITY - BE DEFINED? YOU CHOSEN AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT AND THROWN TOGETHER A USELESS, ILLOGICAL AND IMPENETRABLE ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT "SADLY, WE JUST DON’T HAVE IT." YOU MIGHT BE RIGHT, BUT WHERE IS THE PROOF, AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOW IS ANYONE TO MAKE USE OF WHAT YOU HAVE DONE?

The Objectivist said...

Thank you for the note. Here is the implicit argument.

(P1) If persons are morally responsible, then they choose the principles that generate their thoughts and actions and do so in way that is not (directly or indirectly) explained by external forces.

(P2) It is false that persons choose the principles that generate their actions and do so in a way that is not explained by external forces.

(C1) Hence, it is false that persons are morally responsible.

The computer analogy was designed to illustrate this. You might be right in that it failed, but this is what it tried to do. Nothing about recursion principles or self-modifying code will dent this argument since recursive and self-modifying effects result from the computer's initial architecture and external input. They merely create more complex feedback loops.

Also, I don't think that "moral responsibility" can be defined. Like "yellow" and "good," I think it's a conceptual primitive.

The Theist said...

Objectivist, I think you need a very ambitious argument indeed, one which establishes that the concept of control is an impossibility. Your (P1) is false on anyone's account - we don't choose the structures of our minds or brains per se. Rather, over a course of time, we can, via our free actions, exercise a degree of control over them. For example, suppose that a child is aware that her family (including herself) has a predisposition towards chocolate addiction. It seems she's free to either eat, or not eat that first bite. And she's free, over the longer term, to develop the habit of chocolate eating, or not. Are her choices explainable by factors outside her? Perhaps - but you need an argument that if some action is explainable by outside factors, then it isn't under the agent's control. And that seems wrong. "Why did your boy punch the other kid back?" - "Because, that's how I raised him." That seems a true if incomplete explanation, and yet, we think the boy remains in control of his punches.

My main point against you isn't that you rely on a metaphor, but rather that there's more reason to trust our intuitions about and experience of freedom, than there is to believe your argument is sound. That is why on spent so long merely sketching out an alternate metaphor.

The Constructivist said...

O, you should really devote an entire column to the science of mind stuff on which you're basing your arguments here. Did you see Time's recent issue on the topic? It seems from my reading of this and other media accounts that draw on the science and philosophy of mind that you'd be tempted to argue that a sense of personal identity is an illusion as well. Choices (seem to) happen, but there's not really an "I" there making them. But you should check the piece on brain plasticity; it's as significant as the one on gene expression I mentioned back when we were debating race--both make quite strong anti-determinist points.

From what I've read of Nicholas Wade--and I deeply disagree with some of his arguments--he ends up making a constructivist argument for moral responsibility, on evolutionary grounds. That is, praiseworthy/blame-able actions were human assignations to assure that sociality on a larger scale than the clan system would work--this ended up becoming a kind of large-scale, slow-motion eugenics project, as our ancestors wittingly and unwittingly bred themselves into domesticity. So human actions over generations shape genetics, which in turn shape human actions--there's a long-term feedback loop going on here. He suggests it's working out fairly well so far, as evidence such as thinner skull walls over large spans of time suggests that human beings have reduced the human on human violence in everyday life. So there may well be no metaphysical basis for good/bad distinctions, but socially constructed ones will actually have genetic implications. Response?

In my fields, Marxism, existentialism, psychoanalysis, and poststructuralism, among other movements, have lead to similar debates on human agency and responsibility. I take it the definition of moral responsibility you and T are debating is a standard one in Anglo-American philosophy? It seems even that has been contested in these other traditions.

If there's no moral responsibility, on what grounds "should" we oppose factory farming? Just b/c our brains really are no more special than animals'? Well, so what? They eat each other, all the time....

You seem to believe that differences among human brains justify disparate treatment--how do you reconcile your take on race with your take on meat-eating?

T may have inspired me to do a quick hit post, though. Look for it!