Faith, Self-Interest, and Belief in God

The Objectivist
PASCAL LOSES A BET
Dunkirk-Fredonia Observer
November 21, 2006

Many theists claim to rest their belief in God on faith. A person believes something on the basis of faith when he believes in it on the basis of what he knows to be inadequate evidence.

But consider how we normally react to the unsupported belief. Imagine you are in a bar and a biker sitting near you tells you that he is a white supremacist. You ask why and he explains that he while he doesn’t have a good argument for his views, but he nonetheless believes it strongly. In fact, he says, he takes it as a matter of faith. You would consider him to be sad and not just because his beliefs are destructive. Arguably, the opposition of some Catholic groups to free markets and birth control is similarly destructive. Rather your contempt will be based in part on the fact that the biker firmly holds beliefs that he can’t defend. Consistency requires that you take the same view of faith-based religious belief.

Recognizing this failure creates the logical space for Blaise Pascal’s wager. In the 17th century, Pascal argued that it is a good bet to believe in God. His argument makes three assumptions. First, Pascal asserts that while reason can’t tell us whether God exists, we know that he either does or doesn’t exist. Second, Pascal assumes that if God exists, he will send believers to heaven (an eternity of happiness) and will either annihilate non-believers or send them to hell (an eternity of suffering). Third, Pascal assumes that we can decide whether to believe in God and act accordingly.

Pascal argues that if we believe in God, we risk losing out on a few earthly pleasures but gain the chance of gaining an infinite reward. Okay, we’ll lose out on our chance to enjoy mushrooms while watching Martin Scorsese films and the occasional threesome, but these are small losses in the grand scheme of things. If we don’t believe in God then we can sleep late on Sundays and enjoy our sinful ways, but we risk being annihilated or, worse, eternal damnation. Pascal argues that it is irrational to risk an infinite loss just to secure a small gain. This is analogous to the way in which it is irrational to avoid other minor precautions (for example, wearing a seatbelt) that protect against catastrophic loss.

Pascal’s argument survives the usual criticisms that are leveled against it. Some critics argue that God wouldn’t reward someone who merely hedges his bet for self-interested reasons. However, Pascal would likely argue that he is talking about persons having a real commitment to God, which can occur even if the initial motivation to do so was a cynical appeal to self-interest. Other critics argue that the evidence against God’s existence is overwhelming and we are running the risk of shaping our life around a falsity. Even so, Pascal would likely respond, we can’t be sure that God doesn’t exist, any more than we can be certain about other arguments in math and science, and we can’t take the chance of a catastrophic outcome even when it is unlikely to occur. Still other critics argue that a just and loving being like God wouldn’t, and perhaps can’t, annihilate non-believers or send them to hell. Again, while this is likely true since reason suggests as much, the question remains whether we can afford to take this risk. We can’t.

The real reason this argument fails is that it doesn’t take into account all the outcomes that we can’t rule out with certainty. As mentioned above, these outcomes include scenarios where God exists and ones where neither God nor a similar being exists. However, they also include the case where an anti-Christian (or, perhaps, anti-theist) all-powerful god exists. This god hates believers since they annoy him with their constant prayers the way the paparazzi used to infuriate Sean Penn. This god sends believers to hell and all others to heaven. After all, what does he care? It doesn’t cost him anything to send someone to heaven and non-believers haven’t annoyed him. If this is correct, then believing in God poses a tremendous risk. The logic (and underlying mathematical calculation of self-interest) is identical and cancels out the risk one takes by not believing in God.

Pascal’s wager sinks and drags down with it the best case for faith-based religious belief. Faith and self-interest don’t shield believers from the onslaught of science and philosophy. And when we add beliefs about angels, the devil, magical spectacles, and bread being changed into the body of Christ, the need for faith intensifies and we’re moving in the wrong direction.

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The Theist
BELIEF? YOU BET
Dunkirk-Fredonia Observer
November 21, 2006

Seventeenth century French genius Blaise Pascal assumed that in religious matters, nothing at all can be known. Still, in a passage now referred to as “Pascal’s Wager” he argued that one ought to believe in God--not because there is adequate evidence that God exists, but rather because it is prudent, that is, in one’s best interest.

Why? There are four possibilities, and in the absence of evidence, I must hold them to be equally likely. These are: (1) mistaken theism, (2) correct theism, (3) mistaken atheism, and (4) correct atheism. If I believe in God, I either lose little (1), or win infinite gain (2). If I disbelieve, I risk infinite loss (3), or a not-too-significant loss (4). How to bet? Clearly, believing in God is the safer bet; Pascal’s logic seems impeccable.

Despite the fact that Pascal was a mathematical genius, his logic is not impeccable. In fact, The Objectivist kicks a big hole in it. The problem is that if we know nothing at all in matters of religion, then how can we say that there are precisely four options (the numbered ones above)? We can’t. As The Objectivist points out, we’d have to consider anything which is conceivable, such as the scenario of the god who punishes only religious believers. We wouldn’t even be able to use his method of reasoning to decide what’s in our interest to believe, as the options would be infinite, and no human could go through such an endless train of reasoning.

What now? We can, like The Objectivist, reject Pascal’s way of reasoning altogether. But I’ll argue that the right response is to question his assumption that we know nothing in matters of religion. To the contrary, we do know that some religious claims are false, and moreover, everyone should agree that not all religions are equally plausible.

Some founders of religions (big and small) appear clearly in the historical record as power-, sex-, and money-hungry manipulators, and it is rational to trust them much less than founders who come off like genuine friends of God and humankind. Scientology was founded by a science fiction writer as a shameless money-making operation. This religion puts its adherents through a long, expensive, pseudo-scientific therapy, only after many years revealing to them L. Ron Hubbard’s ridiculous story of what’s wrong with the human race. (Search online for the word “Xenu” for this.) Other religions, such as some kinds of Advaita Vedanta Hinduism, cut strongly against common sense, holding that the world we (seem to) see around us in an illusion, there really being just one indescribable thing (“Brahman”). Other religions, such as the “Ghost Dance” religion which swept through certain Native American tribes in the late 19th century, make predictions which turn out to be false. Tragically, one such prediction was that magical garments (“Ghost Shirts”) would repel even the white man’s bullets. You can guess how that claim was refuted. Similarly, there’s an endless parade of Christian sects which (sometimes repeatedly) unsuccessfully forecast the Second Coming of Christ.

Is it hard to grade some religions as more likely to be true than others? Sometimes. Is it rude? It can be. Will it spoil your Thanksgiving dinner if you bring this up? Probably. But if you’re interested in having true beliefs about religion, you have to think about these things. Pascal is too skeptical. There’s a boatload of testimonial evidence from sane, sober, and smart people, in favor of religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. There’s no evidence of any kind for belief in the believer-hating god.

There are two “world views” which predominate right now. First, there’s what I’d call Abrahamic theism--belief in the one God of Abraham (see Genesis 12-25). Second, there’s the world view which is currently dominant around the world, at least in the more educated segment of societies--what philosophers call “naturalism” (roughly: atheism plus the view that all there is is the realm investigated by empirical science). For most thoughtful people nowadays (though by no means all), these are by far the top two contenders for belief--not the only conceivable options, but the only two ones we can imagine actually believing. If you’re in that category, then you’re deciding between naturalism and belief in one perfect personal God, who treats us seriously enough to allow us to reject him completely and permanently (he refuses to force himself on us).

If you’re such a person, it turns out you really should take a cue from Pascal, because you face the four numbered options above. The prudent bet? Believe in God. Pascal himself realized that one can’t simply "believe on command," even when one judges belief to be in one’s best interest. His advice? Take practical steps, such as associating with believers, sending up hope-fueled prayers, and participating in religious rituals. Such a lifestyle will probably, over time, incline one to actually believe.