25 June 2015
The Police Should Feel Ashamed When They Arrest People for Drugs
June 23, 2015
Recently, there was a significant drug bust in Dunkirk. Earlier, there were the usual stream of SUNY-Fredonia students being ticketed or arrested for marijuana. At issue is whether the police, prosecutors, and related officials should feel ashamed at what they’re doing.
Two weeks ago, The Observer reports that six Dunkirk homes were raided in an attempt to prevent people from distributing and using cocaine and heroin. A smorgasbord of agencies were involved in planning or carrying out the raid the houses including the Drug Enforcement Administration, Southern Tier Drug Task Force, Chautauqua County Sheriff’s Office, Dunkirk Police Department, Fredonia Police Department, and county SWAT team. Six Dunkirk and four Buffalo residents were arrested. Money was obviously dumped into this effort.
SUNY-Fredonia’s paper, The Leader, reported that in one weekend at Fredonia State, eight students were arrested or ticketed for marijuana. Such tickets and arrests are a staple of college life at Fredonia.
Drug laws trample liberty. A free country leaves people alone. More specifically, a free country leaves people alone when they are not engaging in force, fraud, or theft. The idea that people should be left alone explains familiar rights, such as the rights of free speech, religion, association, property, gun ownership, and so on.
Philosophers differ as to why the state should leave people alone. John Stuart Mill argued that the state should leave us alone because it almost always makes our lives go worse when it interferes with them. John Locke argued that people should be left alone because such interference fails to respect the fact that they, and not their government, own their bodies and labor. Robert Nozick argued that such interference is wrong because people have a basic moral right to shape their lives according to their own vision, even if the government has a different vision.
The right to be left alone doesn’t depend on whether someone is doing something that is good for him or his neighbors. It protects those who want to have an open marriage, drink copious amounts of alcohol, eat so much they become obese, get garish tattoos, or join the Westboro Baptist Church regardless of whether these choices are wise or whether they create the sort of community favored by mothers of young children.
Part of being left alone is the right to put what you want in your body, whether it be tattoos, penises, or gallons of soda. This applies to drugs. No one seriously believes that the occasional use of some drugs (for example, marijuana) is very bad for you, but even if it were, the right to be left alone protects it anyway. Alcohol prohibition and drug laws don’t leave people alone. Instead, they treat adults as undeserving of control over what goes in their body and thus like children.
There might be an exception to the right to be left alone for certain types of public goods. These are things that benefit nearly everyone and for which it is impractical to make people pay for their individual use of it. Examples include clean air, national security, and roads. This clearly doesn’t apply to drug and alcohol prohibition as it doesn’t benefit everyone. Also, people can have a drug-or-alcohol free life regardless of what others do and, hence, can individually pay for the benefit.
Enter the police. In our system, the legislative and executive branches get to decide what acts are illegal and when they should be pursued. The police’s job is to do what higher ranking officials tell them to do. They don’t make the law, they just enforce it. Still, they should feel ashamed when their job requires them to trample on people’s liberty. My guess is that plenty do.
By analogy, consider the police who had the unenviable task of enforcing alcohol prohibition knowing full well that in most cases alcohol consumption was harmless fun and, in any case, part of American freedom. They must have felt disgusted about what they were doing. If they didn’t, they should have. The same is true of those who got assigned to crack down on gay bars in New York City (see, for example, the Stonewall riots). Similar feelings should have been present in police who got stuck with the job of arresting people for buying or selling raw milk in the last decade, interracial sex and marriage in the 1960’s, or speaking out against World War I.
The police’s feeling ashamed at what they do is not unique. Airmen who conducted Bill Clinton’s illegal war in Serbia might not have wanted to throw their career away, but knew or should have known that they were engaging in an illegal war (no declaration of war and no Congressional approval or funding). The same is true today for immigration and naturalization officials stuck with implementing Barack Obama’s blatantly illegal amnesty for illegal aliens. The assignment of morally distasteful tasks is true for many jobs, but it’s just more obvious when the distasteful task involves trampling on liberty.
The drug prohibition crowd might try to defend what the police are doing by arguing that drugs are not something that free people should be allowed to use unless they get permission from a doctor, nurse-practitioner, or pharmacist. They might argue this because drugs are addictive, flow to children, or make people vicious. The same is true for alcohol and no adult thinker wants the U.S. to prohibit it again. More importantly, this defense involves a misunderstanding of liberty. There are less restrictive ways to prevent addicts from committing crimes or people selling drugs to children than a blanket ban on drugs and liberty always favors these less restrictive ways. By analogy, drunk driving can be prevented without criminalizing alcohol.
The drug prohibition crowd might argue that it is the police’s job to stop people from using drugs and, in the past, alcohol. I agree. I’m merely arguing that they should feel discomfort, if not shame, when doing so.
10 June 2015
Spousal Hires in Academia: Sparse Resources Given to Bedfellows
June 8, 2015
There is an interesting issue as to whether universities should hire couples hire the partners of other faculty and do so without judging them better than other job candidates.
In academia, only about a quarter of instructional faculty get plum tenure-track positions. Professors who are romantically partnered often want to find tenure-track jobs at the same university or, at least, within reasonable commuting distance. Without such positions, they have to choose between one person’s having to leave academia or a commuter marriage. This is hard on a marriage and not great for children.
Stanford historian Londa Schiebinger et al. found this issue is central to many professors’ lives as more than a third of them have an academic partner (for example, a professor or research scientist). In some areas, the percentage is even higher. For example, 83% of women scientists are partnered with another scientist.
In response, universities increasingly hire couples. Schiebinger et al. found that while the proportion of academics who are coupled with another academic has remained constant, the hiring of couples has shot up over the last four decades, going from 3% in the 1970’s to 13% in the 2000s. One in every ten faculty is now brought in as part of a couple hire. Women in particular are focused on having their partner hired as the most common reason they give for turning down a job is the lack of a job for their partner. On a side note, SUNY-Fredonia and Buffalo have made spousal hires, the latter does so regularly.
Critics of spousal hiring argue that it brings problems. First, writing in The Chronicle of Higher Education, Joseph Kay (an English professor writing under a pseudonym) notes that academic couples often vote as a bloc. This is a problem in that if a colleague offends one, he risks losing two votes on important issues like tenure and promotion. Second, Kay points out, there are problems with conflicts of interest. A spouse has to recuse herself in any matter specifically addressing her spouse. The concern is that information on a campus leaks like a sieve and that the ensconced spouse will too often hold a grudge or retaliate against those who voted against her spouse. Third, Kay notes, there are landmines in spousal hiring. If a couple were to split up, an embittered former couple does not make for a happy department.
Fourth, Kay notes, affirmative action guidelines requiring people not be favored based on their personal life go out the window. As Northwestern University professor Laura Kipnis points out, universities increasingly hire and give perks to people, based on whom they’re sleeping with. There is also the moral and legal issue of whether preference should be given to unmarried couples as well as married ones. There are federal and state laws against discriminating on the basis of marital status. These also go out the window.
On the other hand, Stanford’s Schiebinger and Princeton history professor David Bell points out spousal hires are an important tool to recruit and retain the best faculty. This is likely the best argument for it, although it justifies hiring the spouses of star professors and not your standard issue professor.
Bell further argues that spousal hiring is a way to get faculty involved in the university as professors who have commuter marriages often avoid serving on committees, skip out of office hours, and regularly take unpaid leaves in order to spend more time with their spouse and children, all of which results in their having little presence on campus.
Both Schiebinger and Bell claim that spousal hiring adds to the quality of life of the professorate who get the jobs. This claim is odd in that the benefit to married professors comes at the expense of other professors not partnered up to a winner, so it is hard to see why this does anything other than make some professors’ lives go better at the expense of others. The extremely tight market for tenure-track spots makes this tradeoff unavoidable.
The real concern over spousal hiring is that it leads to professors being hired who would not have gotten the job were they not married to a winner. This is a problem given that faculty often spend 30 or more years at a university and a mediocre or worse hire results in decades of subpar teaching and inferior research. A university might judge this worthwhile if the primary spouse is a star, but often this is not the case.
I should note that Schiebinger et al. did not find a difference in productivity once one controlled for rank and gender. Bell reports a similar anecdotal finding. I find this to be implausible and in conflict with my observations, but, if correct, this merit-based objection fails. It is implausible because merit-based hiring processes tries to focus on best predictors of academic success and it is hard to see why, on average, people with less promise are as successful as those with more. By analogy, it is unsurprising that in the NFL, first round draft picks are, on average, better than those drafted later.
In other areas that we care about (for example, Presidential cabinet and Fortune 500 executive boards), we would be wary of someone hired in part based on whom he married to. It is unclear why academia shouldn’t be wary for the same reason.
There is also the issue of resource allocation. Departments or areas within a department are often given to spouses who research and teach in areas that are needed less than other areas. There is only a small chance that a secondary spouse is an expert in exactly the area or department a university most needs. Thus, each such hire is likely to result in a misallocation of university resources. This is a severe problem in those universities that do not have large faculties.
In the end, spousal hiring should probably be used as tool to recruit and retain star faculty. It is a way to pay them more. Resource allocation and, perhaps, merit argue against it being a regular part of hiring.