Stephen Kershnar
Imbalance in Interracial Marriage
Dunkirk-Fredonia Observer
July 20, 2010
In politics, race has reared its ugly head. The NAACP accused the Tea Party of racism. Charges of racism have been directed at the Obama administration’s refusal to prosecute the New Black Panther Party for voter intimidation. Racial comments have plagued Obama’s former minister Jeremiah Wright, Obama administration czars Van Jones and Mark Lloyd, and U.S. Department of Agriculture official Shirley Sherrod. President Obama injected himself into a conflict between a Harvard professor and a police officer and the conflict and summit led to a nationwide discussion of race. Oddly, there is much less discussion of interracial marriage, particularly an asymmetrical marriage pattern, which is far more interesting.
In the U.S., Interracial marriage is common. The 2000 census shows that 4.9% of marriages are interracial (2,669,558 marriages). There is a striking asymmetry in marriages involving whites, blacks, and Asian-Americans. Consider blacks. Black males are far more likely to marry whites than are black women. In 2006, 6.6% of black males (286,000) had a white spouse, whereas only 2.8% of black women (117,000) had one. On a side note a similar pattern likely holds for cohabitation and sex.
Steve Sailor, president of the Human Biodiversity Institute, points out that this difference underestimates the pattern given the acute shortage of black males in relation to black females. The 2000 census indicates that there are 10 black women for every 9 black men. In addition, roughly 10% of young black men (ages 20-29) are incarcerated in a given year (2002 figure) and roughly one in three is under the control of the criminal justice system. In addition, Sailor points out, black women work far more often in corporate offices, universities, and other places that have richer and more educated men and this should be given them greater access to potential white spouses.
The opposite pattern is true for Asian-Americans. For Asian-American/white marriages, 75% involve an Asian-American woman and white man. This is a strong effect given that in 2006, 41% of Asian-American-born women had a white husband. In the past, this pattern has resulted in significantly more Asian-American women being married than Asian-American men. One issue is what explains these asymmetries. A second issue is whether it justifies the anger that is alleged to be percolating among black women and, to a lesser extent, Asian-American men.
One explanation is that black males and Asian-American women are doing what business people often do, expanding their market, thereby giving them access to more buyers and more leverage over ones from their own group. This explanation is unsatisfactory because if it were just an economic explanation one would expect black women and Asian-American men to do the same thing and they don’t do so as often. In addition, if this were correct, Asian-American men and black women would improve their economic position by dating or marrying each other and they don’t. In 2006, there were very few marriages (.02% of all marriages) between Asian-American men and black women.
A second explanation has to do with how social condition shapes women’s preferences. A study by Columbia University professor Raymond Fisman and fellow researchers indicates that when it comes to dating, women have a strong preference for their own race, whereas men don’t. For example, black women prefer black men, Hispanic women prefer Hispanic men, and so on. The one exception was East Asian women (Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans). They treated Asian-American and white men the same and discriminated against others. This explanation claims that the asymmetry is explained by women’s preferences and that these preferences are the result of social conditioning. This explanation doesn’t explain why social conditioning would lead Asian-American women, but not other minority women, to avoid discriminating against white men. In any case, this explanation is at most part of the picture because it doesn’t explain the pattern with regard to blacks. In addition, Steve Sailor points out that the social-conditioning theory fails to take into account how different the conditioning and culture are among groups like Koreans, Filipinos, Cambodian refugees, and 5th generation Japanese-Americans.
A third explanation is that on average, and with many exceptions, black men and Asian-American women are better looking than their same-race counterparts. Black women are considerably more likely to be obese when compared to black men and white women. Using data from The Journal of the American Medical Association, they are 33% and 50% respectively more likely to be obese. In general, society severely punishes obesity. Obese women are 20% less likely to marry and 30% less likely to had sex over the past year when compared to normal-weight women. They are also paid significantly less in the workplace (one study found that obese white women make 24% less). One survey showed that college students would prefer a spouse who is an embezzler, drug user, or shoplifter than someone who is obese. When it comes to dating, Raymond Fisman and his fellow researchers showed that men emphasize their partner’s looks far more than do women.
Asian-American men are on average shorter than other males and society punishes short men. As Stanford University law professor Deborah Rhode points out, short men are less likely to be hired and promoted, paid less, and underrepresented in leadership positions. For example, University of Rochester economics Steven Landsburg points out that on average, men who are 6-feet tall make roughly $6,000 more than someone who is 5-foot-6-inches after controlling for education and experience.
Anecdotally, there are more Asian-American women than men who are sex symbols (for example, Lucy Liu and Sandra Oh) and news anchors (for example, Lisa Ling and Connie Chung). The women also seem to be far more common in online pornography. Don’t believe me? Check. Also, because Asian-American women are less likely to be overweight or obese than their white and black women competitors and they likely have a competitive advantage in dating and marriage that their male counterparts lack. When it comes to stereotypes, as Sailor points out, Asian-American men are often portrayed in TV as less masculine than other groups (for example, African-American men).
I’m not sure what to make of this third explanation. At most, it is part of the picture. Also, whether the pattern is desirable is a question left for another day.
There are reports that black women bitterly resent this pattern. Sailor cites discussions in movies like Waiting to Exhale and daytime talk shows. A similar pattern, albeit less visible, is reported among Asian-American men. It is unclear whether these anecdotes represent a widespread attitude or just attention-grabbing stories. In any case, the resentment is misplaced in that it is hard to see what the objection is to individuals finding love and moving toward a better life. If individuals don’t have moral duties toward racial groups or cultures, and it is hard to see why they would, the resentment is just envy masquerading as race solidarity.
14 July 2010
Constitution: Guns and the Left's Attack on Incorporation
Stephen Kershnar
Guns and the Second Amendment: The Constitution Dodges a Bullet
Dunkirk-Fredonia Observer
July 12, 2010
The recent Supreme Court decision, McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. ____ (2010), is a major victory in a country whose constitution is largely disappearing. In a preceding case, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. _____ (2008), the Court struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. The Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a gun because guns are connected to self-defense. The Court argued that this right allows individuals to possess handguns in their homes.
In McDonald, the Court considered a Chicago law that in effect banned private citizens from having handguns. On a side note, the Court noted that Chicago has one of the highest murder rates in the country (including cities like New York City and Los Angeles) and rates of other violent crimes that exceed the average in comparable cities. Several of the people who sued Chicago did so because they had been threatened or were victims of violence by drug dealers, burglars, etc. and wanted to protect themselves.
Chicago argued that neither the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States”) nor the Due Process Clause (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of the life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”) results in the states like Illinois being subject to the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment says, “A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Chicago argued that the Due Process Clause does not incorporate the Second Amendment (apply it to the states). Rather, the clause only applies to the states only those parts of the Bill of Rights (the first ten Amendments) which are indispensible to a “civilized” legal system. Because there are civilized countries that ban guns, Chicago argued that the Due Process Clause does not apply the Second Amendment to the states. On this view, then, the states can ban gun ownership even if the federal government cannot.
By a 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court rejected Chicago’s argument. Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito argued that the Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment (applies it to the states). His argument has two parts. First, the Due Process Clauses includes a particular right in the first Eight Amendments to the Constitution only if it is (a) fundamental to the U.S.’s scheme of ordered liberty or (b) deeply rooted in the U.S.’s history and tradition. The Court found that the right to self-defense, including the right to a handgun, meets these conditions.
Alito argued that the right to self-defense, including the right to own a gun, is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition. Evidence for this can be seen in that the right was part of the rights of Englishmen before the U.S. came into existence and that this influenced the founders’ thinking. Also, there is evidence that the founders who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights viewed the right to own a gun for self-defense as a fundamental right. In fact, Alito argued, the debate at the time was not over whether citizens had such a right, that was assumed, but whether it was adequately protected by the federal government’s limited powers or whether it warranted separate protection via the Bill of Rights. The historical importance of this right can also be seen in that four states adopted gun-right laws before the Constitution was ratified and nine more did so in the roughly thirty-year period after it went into effect.
Alito refrained from adopting the view that the Due Process Clause incorporates all of the Bill of Rights. Justice Hugo Black famously put forth this position, but the Court never adopted it. However, Alito made it clear that the Court is moving toward Black’s position.
The Court’s reasoning came under sharp attack from the right and left. Conservative Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Due Process Clause protects only process rights and cannot restrict the content of laws in the way in which Alito suggests. For example, Thomas noted, it protects the right against double jeopardy, the right to a lawyer in criminal cases, and so on. Thomas argued that an individual’s right to own a gun is a privilege of American citizenship. Hence, it is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. As the Cato Institute’s Josh Blackman and Ilya Shapiro point out, Thomas sought to reject 140 years of precedent that had been put forth in bad faith by a recalcitrant Reconstruction-era Supreme Court. Thomas’ argument rests on his theory of interpretation. He holds that the Constitution’s meaning is determined by considering how ordinary citizens would have understood the Constitution’s language at the time it was put into place.
Thomas’s approach is appealing. His theory respects the original meaning of the Constitution’s language and its structure (relation between the parts of the Constitution). His interpretation comes closest to what the people who wrote and ratified the Constitution had in mind. The downside is that he gives precedent short shrift. Alito’s argument fits better with precedent. Both produce the same result in so far as they hold that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment.
Justice Stephen Breyer argued the Second Amendment was not intended to protect an individual’s right to own a gun for self-defense. He argues that by roughly 8 to 1, professional historians of early American history agree with him and the Court should avoid second guessing the experts. Breyer argues that even if this were not the case, there are several reasons to think the Due Process Clause does not incorporate the Second Amendment. Among the reasons are that there is no consensus on whether the right to own guns is fundamental, the right does not protect minorities or others neglected by the political system, and determining the scope of the right would force judges to make decisions about gun safety and effectiveness that are outside their area of expertise.
It is hard to know how any of these reasons are relevant. The reasons are policy considerations. If judges consider them, then they cease to interpret the law (what judges are supposed to do) and start to make the law (what legislators are supposed to do). Nor is it clear where these policies come from. They are not explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. Nor are they a part of fundamental American values such as liberty, equality, or democracy. In addition, Breyer’s reasoning fits poorly with his reasoning in other areas, for example, abortion.
The Supreme Court, especially Justices like Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, has in effect crossed out important parts of the Constitution (Commerce Clause, Takings Clause, and Tenth Amendment). They almost got the Second Amendment. Scary.
Guns and the Second Amendment: The Constitution Dodges a Bullet
Dunkirk-Fredonia Observer
July 12, 2010
The recent Supreme Court decision, McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. ____ (2010), is a major victory in a country whose constitution is largely disappearing. In a preceding case, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. _____ (2008), the Court struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. The Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a gun because guns are connected to self-defense. The Court argued that this right allows individuals to possess handguns in their homes.
In McDonald, the Court considered a Chicago law that in effect banned private citizens from having handguns. On a side note, the Court noted that Chicago has one of the highest murder rates in the country (including cities like New York City and Los Angeles) and rates of other violent crimes that exceed the average in comparable cities. Several of the people who sued Chicago did so because they had been threatened or were victims of violence by drug dealers, burglars, etc. and wanted to protect themselves.
Chicago argued that neither the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States”) nor the Due Process Clause (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of the life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”) results in the states like Illinois being subject to the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment says, “A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Chicago argued that the Due Process Clause does not incorporate the Second Amendment (apply it to the states). Rather, the clause only applies to the states only those parts of the Bill of Rights (the first ten Amendments) which are indispensible to a “civilized” legal system. Because there are civilized countries that ban guns, Chicago argued that the Due Process Clause does not apply the Second Amendment to the states. On this view, then, the states can ban gun ownership even if the federal government cannot.
By a 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court rejected Chicago’s argument. Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito argued that the Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment (applies it to the states). His argument has two parts. First, the Due Process Clauses includes a particular right in the first Eight Amendments to the Constitution only if it is (a) fundamental to the U.S.’s scheme of ordered liberty or (b) deeply rooted in the U.S.’s history and tradition. The Court found that the right to self-defense, including the right to a handgun, meets these conditions.
Alito argued that the right to self-defense, including the right to own a gun, is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition. Evidence for this can be seen in that the right was part of the rights of Englishmen before the U.S. came into existence and that this influenced the founders’ thinking. Also, there is evidence that the founders who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights viewed the right to own a gun for self-defense as a fundamental right. In fact, Alito argued, the debate at the time was not over whether citizens had such a right, that was assumed, but whether it was adequately protected by the federal government’s limited powers or whether it warranted separate protection via the Bill of Rights. The historical importance of this right can also be seen in that four states adopted gun-right laws before the Constitution was ratified and nine more did so in the roughly thirty-year period after it went into effect.
Alito refrained from adopting the view that the Due Process Clause incorporates all of the Bill of Rights. Justice Hugo Black famously put forth this position, but the Court never adopted it. However, Alito made it clear that the Court is moving toward Black’s position.
The Court’s reasoning came under sharp attack from the right and left. Conservative Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Due Process Clause protects only process rights and cannot restrict the content of laws in the way in which Alito suggests. For example, Thomas noted, it protects the right against double jeopardy, the right to a lawyer in criminal cases, and so on. Thomas argued that an individual’s right to own a gun is a privilege of American citizenship. Hence, it is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. As the Cato Institute’s Josh Blackman and Ilya Shapiro point out, Thomas sought to reject 140 years of precedent that had been put forth in bad faith by a recalcitrant Reconstruction-era Supreme Court. Thomas’ argument rests on his theory of interpretation. He holds that the Constitution’s meaning is determined by considering how ordinary citizens would have understood the Constitution’s language at the time it was put into place.
Thomas’s approach is appealing. His theory respects the original meaning of the Constitution’s language and its structure (relation between the parts of the Constitution). His interpretation comes closest to what the people who wrote and ratified the Constitution had in mind. The downside is that he gives precedent short shrift. Alito’s argument fits better with precedent. Both produce the same result in so far as they hold that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment.
Justice Stephen Breyer argued the Second Amendment was not intended to protect an individual’s right to own a gun for self-defense. He argues that by roughly 8 to 1, professional historians of early American history agree with him and the Court should avoid second guessing the experts. Breyer argues that even if this were not the case, there are several reasons to think the Due Process Clause does not incorporate the Second Amendment. Among the reasons are that there is no consensus on whether the right to own guns is fundamental, the right does not protect minorities or others neglected by the political system, and determining the scope of the right would force judges to make decisions about gun safety and effectiveness that are outside their area of expertise.
It is hard to know how any of these reasons are relevant. The reasons are policy considerations. If judges consider them, then they cease to interpret the law (what judges are supposed to do) and start to make the law (what legislators are supposed to do). Nor is it clear where these policies come from. They are not explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. Nor are they a part of fundamental American values such as liberty, equality, or democracy. In addition, Breyer’s reasoning fits poorly with his reasoning in other areas, for example, abortion.
The Supreme Court, especially Justices like Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, has in effect crossed out important parts of the Constitution (Commerce Clause, Takings Clause, and Tenth Amendment). They almost got the Second Amendment. Scary.
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